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NOTE
UNION LIABILITY FOR SEX DISCRIMINATION
Women have played an important role in the American labor
movement and in the development of unionization.' The use of lowpaid female labor was one of the original reasons why workers organized. 2 Yet to date, compared with their male counterparts, very few
women in the work force are unionized. They comprise about onefifth of total union membership' and a large portion are members of
a few unions.4 Once members, women rarely serve in policy-making
positions or on governing bodies; negotiating teams, for both sides, are
usually all-male; and, sometimes opportunities for promotions and
positions of responsibility are unaccessible.5 The result is that women's
interests are often not considered in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. Thus, it is no surprise that while membership
figures for women have increased, they have not kept pace with the
increasing number of women entering the work force. 6
Since sex discrimination still pervades the American labor
force, 7 it is a premise of this note that unions, in their collective bargaining capacity, are partly responsible for the situation. If unions
are to truly represent all of labor, they must be held accountable to
their ever-increasing female membership. Recently, the plight of
women has been recognized and legislation is now available to protect a woman from sex discrimination by the very unions charged
with protecting her employment rights. Specific provisions in the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibit unions from causing employers to sexually discriminate; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws
many forms of union discrimination and is widely invoked; the National Labor Relations Act provides a duty of fair representation and
possibly makes it an unfair labor practice to discriminate on ac1.

S. COHEN, LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1960).

2. Id.
3. Dewey, Women in Labor Unions, MoNTHLY LAB. RIv., Feb. 1971, at 42. In
California, only 18% of the women in the work force are organized as compared to 42%
of the men. Los ANGELES COUNTY FEDERATION OF LABOR, POLICY STATEMENT ON
WoMEN

IN THE

WORK FORCE 5 (1970).

4. Dewey, supra note 3, at 42.
5. POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 5-6.
6.

Dewey, supra note 3, at 42.

7. The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor made such a confession at their
delegate meeting of September 21, 1970.

See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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count of sex; and, the California Labor Code also sets forth certain prohibitions against union discrimination. This note shall analyze the
strengths and weaknesses of these available remedies.
Federal Legislative Remedies
The Equal Pay Act of 1963
Wage discrimination is one of the major obstacles women must
overcome to achieve equality in employment. Statistics indicate that
women receive unequal pay for equal work,8 although the Labor
Department has suggested that wage disparities between men and
women exist because women are employed in low-skilled, low-paying
jobs. 9 For whatever reasons, grossly disparate wage scales have long
existed, and Congress has reacted by passing the Equal Pay Act of 1963"'
as one approach to solving the problem.
The Equal Pay Act adds a new section to the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) of 1938.11 Basically, it provides that women shall receive equal pay for equal work; 1 2 and, more specifically, it provides
a cause of action against unions which cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against any of its employees on the basis of
sex. 13 This is appropriate since wage structures are generally established by collective bargaining agreements and unions can intentionally
or unintentionally discriminate against women employees. If an employer is pressured through union picketing or strikes into instituting
or maintaining a prohibited wage differential, the union will be held
solely liable. 4 If the discriminatory wage rates arise out of a collec8.

E.g., "Women working year-round full time as salaried managers, foremen, or

operatives in the manufacture of nondurable goods have earnings which average 48 to 57
percent of those of men in the same occupations." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, SOME FACTS ABOUT WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1971) summarizing information from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SER. P-60,
No. 75, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, table 49 (1970).
9. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, supra note 8, at 5. The statistics cannot
be discounted since as of June 1970 women constituted 37% of all civilian workers.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, VOL. 17, No. 1, EMPLOYMENT
AND EARNINGS 14 (1970).
In 1940, women comprised 25% of the work force, and in
1900 the figure was only 18%.

WOMEN'S BUREAU,

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL.

No.

294, 1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 9.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
11. §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
12. The congressional purpose in passing the Equal Pay Act was to eliminate
"those subjective assumptions and traditional stereotyped misconceptions regarding the
value of women's work." Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 656 (5th
Cir. 1969).
13. FLSA § 6(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(2) (1964), quoted in full note 26, infra.
14. 29 C.F.R. § 800.106 (1971).
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tively bargained contract, the union must share the responsibility with

the employer.' 5

Violations of the equal pay requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act may be enforced directly in three ways.'" First, a

civil action for damages, primarily lost wages, may be brought by or on

behalf of any injured employees.' 7 Second, the secretary of labor may
Reinstatement of uninstitute an injunction suit to enforce the act.'
lawfully discharged employees and payment of lost wages may both be
ordered in such a proceeding.19 Although an injunctive suit is normally brought only against the employer, labor organizations are also subject to the injunctive relief provisions of the FLSA.2 0 Third, the attorney general of the United States may bring criminal proceedings
against violators of the act. 2 ' If a violation has been willful, author-

ized penalties are imprisonment for up to six months, fines of up to
$10,000, or both.22
Employees may desire to complain or file grievances in order to
take advantage of these available direct actions, but threats of discharge
from employment or of expulsion from a union are viable methods of coercing members to drop charges or pending complaints.
To protect employees and union members from such retaliation and
23
to encourage reports of violations, the FLSA forbids "any person

15. Id.
16. It appears that, thus far, only one reported action has been brought directly
against a union charging a section 6(d)(2) violation. In Shultz v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 315 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1970), the secretary of labor filed an action alleging violation of the equal pay provisions with respect to job classifications. The action was brought directly against both the employer and the union on the basis that the
union contract had established arbitrary job classifications which created discriminatory
wage rates. The court concluded that all jobs which the secretary chose to compare
were not shown to be equal in skill, effort, and responsibility. Therefore, the plaintiff
had not proven any violations.
17. FLSA § 16(b),(c), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),(c) (1964). Section 16(b) authorizes either a suit by one or more employees on their own behalf, or a suit by one or more
employees on behalf of themselves and all other employees similarly situated. Section
16(c) authorizes the secretary of labor to bring suit on behalf of one or more employees.
18. FLSA § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964).
19. See Mitchell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 278 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1960).
Where other valid reasons for discharge justify denial of reinstatement, an employee
may still be entitled to back pay. Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.
1962).
20. See FLSA § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964).
21. FLSA § 16(a), 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1964).
22. Id.
23. The FLSA fails to define what "any person" as used in that act encompasses.
Nevertheless, the term "any person" has been judicially interpreted to include a labor
union, its officers and members, even though "[tihe framers of the Act wished to preserve the rights of labor unions and not to permit the Act to be used to interfere with the
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from discharging or discriminating in any way against an employee who
files a complaint, institutes any kind of proceeding, or serves on an
24
industry committee.

In addition to the three direct methods of enforcing the Equal
Pay Act, the possibility exists of indirect enforcement by allowing an
employer who has been found guilty of sex discrimination to use the
act as a basis for seeking contribution from a union who was in pari
delicto.25 This was tried in one case, but the court held that a complaint which simply alleged the union had actively participated in
negotiations was insufficient since it set forth no specific facts tending
to prove that the union had "caused" the employer to discriminate
within the meaning of the act. 26

A motion for summary judgment in

favor of the third party defendants was granted. On the other hand,
the court indicated that the act might be available under the proper set of
facts 27 and suggested that contribution from a third party defendant

28
might be possible under common law theories of recovery.
The problem most frequently raised in equal pay cases seems to
be discrimination in job classifications which serve as the basis for discriminatory wage rates. Women are given different classifications and
much lower wages for work that is substantially equal to that of their

male counterparts.29

Murphy v. Miller Brewing Co. 30

raised the

internal affairs of a union or the right of a union to discipline its members." Bowe v.
Judson C. Bums, Inc., 137 F.2d 37, 38 (3d Cir. 1943). This interpretation was made
prior to passage of the Equal Pay Act amendment to the FLSA. Nevertheless, the
prohibitions apply to the equal pay provisions. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, FIRST ANNUAL DIGEST OF LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS

(Opinion Letter issued

Apr. 9, 1965).
24. FLSA § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1964).
25. Wirtz v. Hayes Indus., Inc., 58 CCH Lab. Cas. 43,556, 43,557 (N.D. Ohio
1968).
26. Id. at 43,558. FLSA § 6(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(2) (1964) provides:
"No labor organization, or its agents, representing employees of an employer having
employees subject to any provisions of this section shall cause or attempt to cause such
an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of paragraph (1) of this
subsection." [Emphasis added]. FLSA § 6(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(4) (1964) defines labor organization as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which the employees participate and which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work". '"This
is the same definition of 'labor organization' that is used in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, and will be applied in the same manner." 29 C.F.R. § 800.109
(1971).
27. 58 CCH Lab. Cas. at 43,558.
28. Id.
29. See Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970).
30. 307 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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question of union involvement in such a classification scheme.
Women laboratory technicians sought injunctive relief and back pay
because of alleged sex discrimination in employment practices. The
Miller Co. asserted that the union should be held liable because the discriminatory job classifications had been established in a collective
bargaining contract and the union had represented the women in the
negotiations.
The court found evidence of sexual discrimination in the different
wage rates paid due to job classifications. More importantly, it found
no evidence that the unions had proposed the discriminatory provisions of the contract. The fact that the local and international unions would not strike or picket over Miller's refusal to equalize the
wages did not support the claim that the unions caused or attempted
to cause employer discrimination.3 1
Thus, according to the Miller Brewing decision, unions must do
something more than merely agree to discriminatory wage contracts
before they will be found in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Some
affirmative action must be taken before liability will be imposed. The
decision infers that if the union, rather than the employer, had proposed
the sexually discriminatory provisions, the court could have found
union liability. This may raise the question of whether Miller Brewing
removes some of the substance of the act's prohibitions against union
caused discrimination. Apparently, unions may accept any discriminatory contract terms without incurring Equal Pact Act liability.
While job classifications by union-management collective bargaining agreements are not binding on the courts, they are established
by individuals with many years of experience in the field, and some
recognition should be given to their judgment. However, courts should
be encouraged to look into the union-management motives behind classification systems and, for that matter, behind merit and seniority systems as well. For example, in Schultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie
Products2 the court found that the wage differential between male
and female roller machine operators was based in part on sex and
was not the product of a bona fide job classification system; 3 it was
thus held to be indicative of the employer's discriminatory view of the
job. The court looked into the motives behind the wage differential and
31. Id. at 839.
32. 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
33. The committee report on the final version of the Equal Pay Act commented
on job classifications as follows: "'This language recognizes that there are many factors
which may be used to measure the relationship between jobs and which establish a valid
basis for a difference in pay. These factors will be found in a majority of the job classification systems. Thus, it is anticipated that a bona fide job classification program that
does not discriminate on the basis of sex will serve as a valid defense to a charge of discrimination." H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
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"pierced" the classification "veil" to find liability for sexual discrimination.
Unfortunately, statutory construction and judicial interpretations
have limited the effectiveness of Equal Pay Act sanctions. For example, Bowe v. Judson C. Burns, Inc. 34 held that a district court had no
jurisdiction to order a union to reinstate the plaintiffs in an action
brought by them to restrain their union from violating provisions of
the FLSA. An employee's action can be maintained only to recover
back wages and liquidated damages from the employer since employees are not authorized to bring direct actions to restrain either unions
or employers.3 5 Actions for injunctive relief lie exclusively with the
secretary of labor. 36 The only civil remedy available from district
courts against unions under the Equal Pay Act is for injunctive relief
to restrain unions from causing employers to discriminate in the pay37
ment of wages.
Additionally, much of the Equal Pay Act's potential strength
is drained by its status as an amendment to the minimum wage sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Congress felt that a simple
expansion to include an equal pay concept would be the easiest and
most efficient course of action due to the "long history and experience of
Government and business and workers with the Fair Labor Standards
Act. ' 38 But the FLSA is laden with exceptions and those exceptions
are just as applicable to the equal pay provisions as to other portions
of the act. Generally, the act does not apply to executive, administrative, and professional employees, retail or service establishment employees, agricultural workers, certain workers of publications or news39
papers, motion picture theater employees and switchboard operators.
As a result, the Equal Pay Act covers only one-half of the female employees in the United States. 0
34.

137 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943).

35. Id. But cf. Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 410 (E.D. La.
where a district court held that a private action for injunctive relief from a
215(a)(3) violation regarding discharge for filing a complaint or testifying may
forced on general "federal question" jurisdiction because the mere silence of
215(a) (3) regarding a private remedy for breach is not decisive.

1969),
section
be ensection

36. FLSA § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
37. Wirtz v. Hayes Indus., Inc., 58 CCH Lab. Cas. 43,556 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
38. H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963).
39. FLSA § 13(a), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
Furthermore, FLSA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 203 limits FLSA coverage to employees engaged in
the production of goods for interstate commerce, or employees working for enterprises
engaged in commerce.
40. Moran, Reducing Discrimination: Role oj the Equal Pay Act, MONTHLY
LAB. REv., June, 1970, at 31. Proposals have been made to extend the coverage to administrative, professional, and executive employment. Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098
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Because of the few cases decided under section 206(d)(2, it
is difficult to determine the effectiveness of prohibitions against union
caused wage discrimination. This is true of both direct actions against
unions and of indirect actions by employers seeking contribution. As
has been pointed out, no union has yet been held liable. Furthermore, Miller Brewing may have weakened the intended strength of
the act. Yet, even with its limitations and exemptions, the Equal
Pay Act probably provides the best relief available for wage discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196441 is also available as a

basis of relief from union sex discrimination.42 Generally, any union,
as well as any private employer, which has twenty-five or more members or employees engaged in an industry affecting interstate com-

merce comes within the purview of the act.43 Section 703(c) of Title

VII enumerates those union practices which are declared unlawful.'4
The section adopts the same causation test used by the Equal Pay Act,

namely that it shall be unlawful "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of the secBefore the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1970).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -12 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Title VIII.
42. Lansdale v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 430 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1970).
Some union-management agreements have adopted the wording of Title VII for use
in the contract itself. For example, the General Motors Corp.-UAW Collective Bargaining Agreement of Nov. 11, 1970 provides: "General Motors Corp. and the UAW
recognize their respective responsibilities under federal, state, and local laws relating to
fair employment practices.
"The Company and the Union recognizes the moral principles involved in the area
of civil rights and have reaffirmed in their Collective Bargaining Agreement their commitment not to discriminate because of race, creed, color, age, sex or national origin."
CCH LAB. L. REP. 59,905, at 85,024 (1971).
43. Title VII § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). Among those exempted from
coverage are private membership clubs, Title VII § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b);
and religious or educational institutions and certain employees thereof, Title VII § 702,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964).
44. Title VII § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964), which provides in part:
"It shall be unlawful employment practice for a labor organization (1) to exclude or to
expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in
any way which would deprive ... any individual of employment opportunities ....
because of such individuals race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (3) to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of
this section."

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

tion."45 However, Title VII's coverage is much broader than that
of the Equal Pay Act since it includes all forms of discriminatory employment practices, not just wage discrimination. Moreover Title VII
has the advantage that it is not limited by the FLSA exemptions.4"
Because of the overlap with the Equal Pay Act wage provisions, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), an agency created to enforce Title VII,4 will consider and adopt any relevant opinions of the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division Administrator
which interpret "equal pay for equal work" provisions. 8 This should
insure uniformity in wage discrimination cases. Despite other procedures available to curb discriminatory activities by unions, women have
turned increasingly to the EEOC for redress of alleged grievances.
There are two principle attractions to this approach. First, an individual may easily file for relief from a violation. The complaint procedures are simple and do not necessitate the aid of attorneys" 9 or
the joining of the secretary of labor. Second, people are most likely
to pursue alternatives providing the greatest chance of success. The
commission has not hesitated to find union violations, ° and this may
have encouraged use of the Title VII procedures. In addition, in45. Title VII § 703(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (3). Compare id. with FLSA § 6,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(2).
46. See notes 41-42 & accompanying text supra.
47. Title VII § 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1971).
49. Title VII § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
50. EEOC Decision No. 71-1325, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE % 6214 (Mar. 2,
1971) (union failed to protest an employer's unlawful practice which discriminated
against women); EEOC Decision No. 71-687, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE
6186 (Dec.
16, 1970) (union party to an employment contract that restricted women to certain
jobs); EEOC Decision No. 71-362, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE
6169 (1970) (union
failed to oppose the inclusion of seniority provisions in a collective bargaining contract
that unlawfully discriminated against women); EEOC Decision No. 71-49, CCH EMP.
PRAc. GUIDE
6162 (1970) (union first excluded female clerical workers, as a class,
from a proposed collective bargaining unit, and then attempted to include these employees in the unit but with restricted job opportunities); EEOC Decision No. 70-676,
CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE
6144 (1970) (union refused to admit women into apprenticeship programs); EEOC Decision No. 70-600, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE
6122 (1970)
(union entered into and supported an agreement by which airline stewardesses were automatically terminated upon pregnancy without being offered an alternative leave of
absence); EEOC Decision No. 70-375, CCH EMp. PRAc. GUIDE
6081 (1969) (union
maintained separate male and female hiring halls and restricted job assignments of
qualified females); EEOC Case No. YSF 9-120, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6037
(1969) (union failed to equally represent females despite the fact that the union knew
of an employer's discriminatory policy); EEOC Case No. CH 7-3-133, CCH EMP. PRAC.
GUIDE
6018 (1969) (job classification system, maintained under a union contract, designated some jobs for males and other jobs for females with seniority based on this
alone).
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junctive relief is available, 5 the district 53courts have jurisdiction,5 2 and
the procedural requirements are minimal.
Title VII provisions have also been used successfully by employers attempting to acquire contribution or indemnification from representative unions. In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.5 4 an action
was brought by female employees against both their employer and
their union, alleging a system of segregation and classification by sex,
especially in the seniority system. The company filed a cross-claim
against the union for indemnity or contribution in the event any liability
was imposed for discriminatory employment practices. The district
court found no basis on which the union could be held liable under
the cross-complaint. However, dicta in that case 5 and in a subsequent one, 5 6 indicate that under other circumstances an employer may

have a right to contribution or even idemnification from a labor organization involved in the discrimination.
The National Labor Relations Act

Protection of employment rights, concurrent to that offered by
51. Title VII § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
52. Title VII § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1964).
53. As would be expected in any provision for equitable relief, exhaustion of legal
remedies is required. If a state has laws prohibiting the challenged employment practice, the EEOC must wait until 60 days after state proceedings have been commenced
or until such proceedings have been terminated. Title VII § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(b) (1964). Where subsection (b) is involved, the charge must be filed with the
EEOC within 210 days rather than within the regular 90 days after the occurrence of
the alleged practice. Title VII § 706(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964). In EEOC
v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1969), it was held that the EEOC hadno
jurisdiction to receive a complaint by female employees alleging discrimination until
the available state remedies were first exhausted. Cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 430 F.2d
49, 53 (10th Cir. 1969). However, in Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 422
F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970), the Ninth Circuit stated that there was no requirement for
exhaustion of state remedies. The statement in Union Bank concerning "exhaustion of
remedies" was interpreted as requiring only "pursuit of state remedies to the extent required by subsection (b)." Id. at 1031 n.5. The statute of limitations is 90 days. Title
VII § 705(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964). However, if an unlawful practice has
continuing ramifications and "perpetuates the effects of prior discrimination," the period
will be effectively extended. Tippett v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp.
292, 295-96 (M.D. N.C. 1970). The action in that case was brought by female employees against both the local and international unions alleging sex discrimination due
to a loss of seniority and failure of the union to process a grievance in violation of Title
VII. See also United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970); Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
919 (1970).
54. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), rev'd in part 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969).
55. Id. at 358.
56. Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 49 F.R.D. 162, 164 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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Title VII, is also available under sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). 51 The act guarantees workers the right to
organize, to form, join or assist unions, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to refrain from any or all
of these activities. 8 It also sets forth unfair labor practices," and
for labor organizations these include any restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of their guaranteed rights.60 To be unlawful,
the coercion need not be successful. The union will violate the provisions by causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in regard to hiring or tenure or any term or condition of employment which would constitute an employer unfair labor
practice."
A labor organization, as the bargaining agent for employees, has a
statutory affirmative duty to represent all employees in its collective
bargaining unit equally and without discrimination 1 2 -- the so-called duty
of fair representation. Although unions have been charged with
breaching their duty to fairly represent women, 63 there seem to be no
cases decided on the merits of the issue. The first case to declare any
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1964). Specific provisions in Title VII and its legislative history make it apparent that Congress did not intend the enforcement provisions
of this legislation to be exclusive remedies in regard to employment practices. Title VII
§ 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964); 110 CoNo. REc. 13171, where the Senate rejected a
proposed amendment that would make remedial provisions of Title VII exclusive with
regard to claims arising under it. In Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12
(5th Cir. 1966), the court determined that complainants who had a grievance under Title
VII coverage were not limited to those enforcement provisions and were at liberty to
seek redress by asserting unfair labor practice charges before the NLRB.
58. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
59. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
60. NLRA § 8(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1964).
61. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
62. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342
(1964); Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), rev'g per curiam 223
F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1952);
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen Local 76, 323 U.S. 210, 211 (1944). It must be noted that Steele and
Tunstall involved the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964), as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 157(h) (Supp. V, 1970), but the wording of section 2 of that act is similar to
section 7 of the NLRA. Section 2 provides in part: "Fourth. Employees shall have
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter
. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
63. See, e.g., Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970),
where section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1964), which confers federal jurisdiction over suits for violations of collective bargaining contracts, was held to support no federal cause of action for a breach of a union's
statutory duty to fairly represent all its members regardless of sex.
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form of discrimination an unfair labor practice was not decided until
1962 when a sharply divided National Labor Relations Board made
its holding in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.6 4 The discrimination involved was union coercion of an employer which resulted in the reduction of an employee-union member's seniority status. Although the
Second Circuit refused to enforce the board's order, 65 subsequent NLRB
and court decisions have found racial discrimination by bargaining
representatives to be an unfair labor practice. 66 Since these un-

fair labor practice sections are not to be interpreted narrowly 67 and

have already been given broad constructions,"" there should be no reason
why sex discrimination cannot be included.
Additionally, the duty of fair representation proscribes discrimination in grievance processing as well as in collective bargaining.
Contrary to the passive standards of the Equal Pay Act,69 employer
discrimination must be resisted. Since Miranda Fuel, board decisions

have found violations of the fair representation concept whenever unions have refused to process member grievances because of race or whenever they have encouraged racial segregation.70 This basic approach

should also impose union liability for similar activities resulting in
sex discrimination.
Individual employees have standing to enjoin the enforcement

of union-management agreements which violate a union's duty of fair
representation.7

1

Generally, before an action may be brought, an em-

ployee must first exhaust the grievance procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement.7'

However, in the case of discrimina-

tion charges, going through union channels may be inappropriate where
64. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
65. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The court of appeals was of the opinion that the alleged discrimination was wholly unrelated to "union
membership, loyalty, the acknowledgement of union authority, or the performance of
union obligations .... ." Id. at 175 (quoting from the dissenting opinion of the
NLRB decision).
66. Metal Workers Locals f & 2, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Rubber Workers
Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Longshoremen Local 1367,
54 CCH Lab. Cas. 17,911 (1966).
67. To interpret the National Labor Relations Act narrowly "would to a large
degree render such right meaningless in the area of union administration of the bargaining agreement." Rubber Workers 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 20 (5th Cir. 1966).
68. See, e.g., International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961); Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960); Radio Officers v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB v. Clark & Lewis Co., 274 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. International Woodworkers, 243 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1957).
69. FLSA § 6(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2) (1964), quoted in note 28 supra.
70. See cases cited in note 66 supra.
71. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
72. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650 (1965).
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the charge is against the union itself. Under such circumstances, a suit
may be brought without exhausting the contractual remedies. As the
court said in Vaca v. Sipes:
[B]ecause these contractual remedies have been devised and are
often controlled by the union and the employer, they may well
prove unsatisfactory or unworkable for the individual grievant.
The problem then is to determine under what circumstances the
individual employee may obtain judicial review of his breach-ofcontract claim despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial procedures."
Since 1944," the courts have not required employees charging racial
discrimination to submit their grievance to a "group which is in large
75
part chosen by the [party] against whom their real complaint is made.
Therefore, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is not controlling where
efforts would be
futile and application would defeat federal labor
76
relations policy.
As should be apparent at this point, there are overlaps between
the NLRA and Title VII. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 77 considered the election of remedies question and established that a plaintiff
could pursue parallel prosecutions, both in court and by arbitration,
provided he made an election of remedies after final adjudication by
both tribunals. 78 Title VII offers expansive protections but "there
continues to exist a broad potential range of arbitrary union conduct
not specifically covered . . . which may violate the union's duty of
fair representation. '79 It is in filling those gaps that the NLRA becomes important. It is especially important as a basis of relief when
unions or employers do not have the requisite number of members
73. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
74. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
75. Id. at 206.
76. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. R. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 331 (1969).
77. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
78. Id. at 715. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the administrative agency that guarantees enforcement and protection of rights under the NLRA.
Investigation and certification of bargaining representatives for employees is one of its
duties and in the process of carrying out these duties, discrimination based on sex or race
by unions is sometimes encountered. However, the NLRB has no authority to investigate an unfair labor practice charge or issue a complaint against a party charged. This
duty is left to the general counsel and when he issues a complaint a hearing is conducted
before a trial examiner who issues a report on the hearing. The report is then reviewed
by the board which makes a final decision whether an unfair labor practice has been
committed. If it is decided one has been committed the board then usually issues a
cease and desist order requiring the violator to refrain from the unlawful conduct which
is in violation of the NLRA. See CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 1060 (1969).
79. Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir. 1966); accord
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970); Packinghouse Workers
v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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or employees for Title VII jurisdiction.80
California Statutory Remedies
Notwithstanding the federal relief available, state remedies may

also exist for union sex discrimination.

California has its own pro-

vision regarding equal pay which provides, as does the federal legislation, that there shall be equal pay for equal work."' The Division of
Industrial Welfare is authorized to investigate claims and seek conciliation.8 2 If a settlement is not arranged, it may bring suit to recover the difference in wages.8 3 Alternatively, the aggrieved woman
may herself bring an action to recover lost wages and the costs
of bringing the suit.8 4 Another provision makes "every employer or

other person" guilty of a misdemeanor for violation of the equal pay
conditions.85 Unfortunately, the penalty is negligible and too weak
to discourage discrimination. The statute of limitations for all these
actions is two years if the employee was unaware of the discriminatory wage rates, or 180 days after obtaining such knowlwedge 8 6
As yet, no cases have been decided under these statutory provisions.

California also has a Fair Employment Practices Act which prohibits discrimination in employment because of race, religion, color,
sex, national origin, or ancestry.8 7 It is an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization to exclude, expel, or restrict a person on
any of those criteria.8 8 Thus, it is unlawful to have a segregated
membership or to discriminate against a person because of sex in the
election of union officers.8 9 If a member feels there has been a sex80. The jurisdictional number of employees is 25 or more. Title VII § 701(b),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
81. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(a) (West 1971) provides: "No employer shall pay
any individual in his employ at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the
opposite sex in the same establishment for the same quantity and quality of the same
classification of work."
82. Id. § 1197.5(c).
83. Id. § 1197.5(f).
84. Id. § 1197.5(g).
85. Id. § 1199 which provides in pertinent part: "Every employer or other person acting either individually or as an officer, agent, or employee of another person is
guilty of a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50)
or by imprisonment for not less than 30 days, or by both, who does any of the following:
(d) Pays or causes to be paid any employee a wage less than the rate paid to an
employee of the opposite sex as required by Section 1197.5 of this code."
86. Id. § 1197.5(i).
87. Id. §§ 1410-1433.
88. Id.§ 1420(b).
89. Id.
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discriminatory practice, she may file a complaint with the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) which possesses the power
to issue cease and desist orders.9" It is also unlawful to discriminate
because the member opposes such union practices or files a complaint."
There is a one year period from the time the unlawful practice
took place in which to file a complaint.12 Operating EngineersLocal 12
v. FEPC93 is the only case wherein the court has found a union violation but it involved racial rather than sexual discrimination. The
lack of case law in these areas is probably due to the federal relief
available and because federal law has historically pre-empted much
of the labor field. Since all the federal acts have "affecting commerce"
requirements, state law is applicable to workers, members, or industries that do not affect interstate commerce.9 4
Federal and state legislation are concurrently available provided
the jurisdictional requirements of each particular act are met. This
may present a complaining employee or attorney with the dilemma
of choosing whether to use the state or federal courts for relief. In
regards to equal pay, the federal Equal Pay Act provides a larger
body of case law. That act also provides relief from union caused
sexual discrimination in wages whereas the California equal pay statute does not. However, the Equal Pay Act is hampered in its effectiveness because it is subject to the FLSA exemptions.9 5 If a female
union member is so excluded from coverage she may turn to the
state legislation, which has no such exclusions. But a misdemeanor
charge is the only California sanction available against unions.96
This insubstantial penalty may not give a complainant the relief desired and may leave a woman subject to the FLSA exemptions without any effective remedy.
The state does provide prohibitions against union sex discrimination with regard to union membership. 97 Nevertheless, both Title
VII and the NLRA provide such protection at the national level
without the exemptions that hamper the Equal Pay Act. Thus, the
state remedy is of secondary importance and of limited usefulness unless a person is in someway excluded from federal coverage.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. § 1426.
Id. § 1420(e).
Id. § 1422.
276 Cal. App. 2d 504, 81 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037

(1970).
94. See, e.g., FLSA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1964).
§ 206(d)(2) (1964).
95. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
96. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1199 (West 1971).
97. Id. § 1420(b).

FLSA § 6(d)(2), 29 U.S.C.
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Conclusion
Unions have a strong influence on the state of the nation's economy, politics, and labor-management relations. However, although
women comprise about two-fifths of the workers in this country and
are all potential union members, they have not received, for the most
part, 98 adequate consideration when unions have formulated policy. 99
Fairer representation will become increasingly important since a major shift in women's employment patterns seems inevitable.100
To prompt unions out of their general reluctance to recognize
women's rights, specific remedies are available, each with various
98. Some large trade unions in this country as well as foreign nations have gone
forward with progressive programs. For example, Swedish labor organizations have
prepared programs which will make it possible for men to share in child care along with
the women. These unions and employer organizations also have a joint collaboration
body which works for equality between the sexes in accordance with this principle.
Address by Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden, Women's National Democratic Club
in Washington, D.C., June 8, 1970. Among the labor unions in this country demonstrating special concern for the problems of women workers-due primarily to the large
number of women members in those unions-are the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Office and Professional
Employees Int'l Union, the American Federation of Teachers, and the American Newspaper Guild. The latter labor organization had a convention in November 1970 on sexual discrimination and women's rights in which local unions were urged to protect female rights in the newspaper industry and to put more women in union positions. The
convention members felt that equal pay for women may be the first thing bargained off
by unions and urged unions not to do so. ThE GuiLD REPoRTER, Jan. 22, 1971, at 1.
The UAW and the American Federation of Teachers also had conventions which dealt
extensively with the problems of women and unionization.
99. "The role of women as permanent members of the work force must be recognized and the obstacles to their full employment removed, in part through collective bargaining but in other ways as well. Since attitudes towards the employment of women are
so important in determining their opportunities, the unions have an educational role to
play, providing information on the demographic and cultural evolution that has taken
place on new types of job opportunities and training possibilities. But since many of the
obstacles to the employment of women can only be solved by the community as a whole,
the trade unions will also have to act as a pressure group in bringing about the political
changes that are required." Trade Unions and the Problems of Women Workers, THE
OECD OBSERVER, June 1969 at 24, 27.

100. "Many-more women workers in the 1970's must prepare to enter work outside
the traditional women's occupations if they are to find jobs in keeping with their abilities." It is expected that there will be new sources of employment for women without
college degrees in the growing skilled trades. The skilled trades are notable because
they require lengthy training periods. Unionization efforts in those fields will have to
consider the female in negotiations. Furthermore, there are widely held prejudices, especially in the skilled trades area, that some jobs are "feminine" while others are "masculine." If women are ready to enter those fields which have traditionally been considered "masculine," unions must also be ready to stand behind their female members in
combating such artificial restrictions. Hedges, Women Workers and Man Power Demands in the 1970's, MoNTHLY LAB. REv., June 1970, at 19.
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strengths and weaknesses. The Equal Pay Act guarantees the basic
right of equal pay for equal work and, as an amendment to the FLSA,
it benefits from the large body of interpretive case law; but, nearly half
the work force is excluded, injunctive relief is extremely restricted,
and the Miller Brewing decision has considerably weakened its impact.
Title VII offers simple filing procedures, expanded coverage, private
injunctive relief and EEOC conciliation efforts; but it has limited
jurisdiction. The National Labor Relations Act has recognized a duty
of fair representation prohibiting unfair labor practices, and makes provisions for injunctive relief; but no cases have been decided on the
basis of sex and it is not yet clear whether race and sex will be found
analogous. Statutory state remedies have also been enacted but, in any
event, the penalties are negligible.
Despite the limitations of each of these procedures, the absence of
litigation is surprising. With the exception of Title VII cases, few
direct actions have been brought against union violations. Thus, a
few recommendations may be appropriate. Working women should
seek union support in enforcing their employment rights, but if unions
are recalcitrant in exercising their obligation of fair representation,
women should be encouraged to file direct actions against those same
unions. Also, current legislation might be amended to eliminate some
of its weaknesses. Possibly the Equal Pay Act could be exempted
from the FLSA coverage exclusions and could be amended to grant
private injunctive relief powers. Sex discrimination could be established
as an unfair labor practice under the NLRA either by statutory amendment or by a strong test case. And the state provisions, however, limited their usefulness, might provide a more attractive procedure if the
penalties were increased and became more realistic. Other, more effective approaches should be explored but one theory should remain basic
to any re-evaluation of this specific area of equal employment legislation-unions should be held accountable if they fail to adequately represent women.
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